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1Abstract
This experiment was conducted to study the effect of 
feedback on task performance under a low performance 
standard (goal). Fifty-two undergraduate students were 
presented with the task of mentally summing seven 
single-digit numbers to solve a problem. Subjects either 
received a high or low goal for the number of problems to 
solve in 15 minutes, and continuous feedback or no 
feedback about how many problems they had solved. It was 
predicted that feedback would result in higher performance 
for high goal subjects and lower performance for low goal 
subjects. A marginal main effect of goal difficulty 
(p<.067) in the predicted direction was obtained, but no 
goal difficulty-feedback interaction. Possible 
explanations for the observed results are discussed along 
with implications for future research.
2Chapter I 
Introduction
Overview
One of the most widely studied and well established 
theories in Industrial/Organizational Psychology is 
Locke's goal setting theory (See Locke, Saari, Shawf & 
Latham, 1981, for a review). The basic principle of the 
theory is that as the level of a performance goal 
(quantitatively measured) increases, the corresponding 
level of performance will increase in a linear manner.
Two conditions are considered necessary for this linear 
relationship to be observed (Locke et al., 1981). First, 
the goal must be accepted by the person who will perform 
the task. Second, feedback must be provided concerning 
task performance.
Will the same linear relationship be observed when 
no feedback is provided? It is proposed here that the 
relationship between goal difficulty and performance, 
without feedback, is also linear, but that the 
relationship is weaker (see Figure 1).
It has been repeatedly shown that a high goal with 
feedback results in greater performance than a high goal 
without feedback. However, as depicted in Figure 1, it is 
proposed that the opposite goal-performance relationship 
will be observed at the lower end of the "level of goal"
3FeedbackHigh
No Feedback
Level of
Performance
Low
HighLow
Level of Goal
Figure 1 . Hypothesized performance 
interaction between goal level and 
feedback.
4continuum. That is, a low goal without feedback will result in 
greater performance than a low goal with feedback.
As will be explained in a later section, the mechanism by 
which feedback is predicted to result in decreased performance 
under low-goal conditions is Parkinson's law. This decrease is 
proposed to result from a significant amount of "lengthening" of 
performance under low-goal conditions, but only when feedback is 
provided. When no feedback is provided the "lengthening" of 
performance time to meet the low goal is predicted to be 
significantly less, resulting in superior performance.
Background
If two people of equal ability are given different goals for 
the amount of work they must complete in a specified period of 
time, the person with the higher goal will complete more of the 
task. For example, if one person is told that he has 1 hour to 
produce 10 widgets and another person is told that he has 1 hour 
to produce 15 widgets, the person who has the goal of completing 
15 widgets will produce more widgets in the 1 hour. Note that 
the person need not reach the goal of 15 widgets to still produce 
more than his "10 widget" counterpart. This example provides a 
concrete illustration of the basic tenet of goal setting theory: 
the higher the set goal— the higher the observed performance.
5Locke (1968) added a necessary condition to his 
hypothesized relationship by stating that for the linear 
relationship between goal level and performance to be 
observed, the goal had to be accepted by the person. If a 
person was told that his goal was to produce 15 widgets in
1 hour, but he knew that he could not possibly produce
even 12 widgets per hour, he would probably not ‘attempt 
the goal. In this case, when the goal was not accepted,
the linear relationship would not be observed? we would
probably expect an inverted-U relationship between goal 
difficulty and performance (Erez & Zidon, 1984).
Another condition Locke includes as part of his 
linear relationship is the specificity of the goal which 
is sought. The specificity of the goal is generally 
concerned with the difference between "do your best" goals 
and specific, high goals. Eight studies conducted by 
Locke and Bryan (reported in Locke, 1968) compared these 
two types of goals. Locke concluded the following:
In six of the eight studies the subjects trying 
for specific hard goals performed at a significantly 
higher level than subjects trying to "do their 
best." Thus, a "do best" goal does not tend to 
produce (under conditions of these studies) the 
highest possible level of performance, (p. 169)
It is therefore necessary to provide a person with a 
specific goal (e.g., "produce 15 widgets in the next 1
6hour"), as opposed to a non-specific goal ("produce as 
many widgets as you can in the next 1 hour") to observe 
the goal-performance linear relationship.
To summarize, Locke's initial formulation in his 1968 
article proposed a linear relationship between goal 
difficulty and performance if the goal set was of a 
specific nature, and the goal was deemed "acceptable" by 
the person who would attempt it.
The actual mechanism by which the linear 
relationship occurs is very interesting and robust (Latham 
& Locke, 1979). Initial efforts by other authors to 
explain the process by which higher goals lead to higher 
performance concluded that the mere presence of a goal 
served to motivate the person to do better on the task 
(Locke, 1967). However, Locke's (1967) study, which 
partialed out the motivational component, showed that the 
actual relationship is not that simple.
In offering an explanation of how the goal setting 
mechanism works, Bryan and Locke (1967) gave subjects 
either a minimum or excess amount of time to complete an 
addition task. Results showed that subjects given excess 
time took longer to complete the task than subjects given 
a minimum amount of time. They concluded that "the effect 
of the different time limits appeared to be a function of 
the differing performance subgoals which they induced" (p. 
177) .
7It is plausible to interpret Bryan and Locke's 
(1967) statement as meaning that a person who has a 
specific and attainable goal externally set for him will, 
in turn, use a cognitive strategy by which he successively 
sets, and meets, his own "intermediate" goals to reach the 
final goal. For example, a person who is given the goal 
of producing 15 widgets in 1 hour might cognitively 
formulate that to reach his final goal he should produce 
about one widget every 4 minutes. This goal of 1 widget 
per 4 minutes then becomes the intermediate goal the 
person tries to meet. Following this logic, it is easy to 
see how a person would produce more with a 15 widget per 
hour goal versus a 10 widget per hour goal.
Knowledge of Results
Another much studied variable in the 
goal-performance relationship is knowledge of results 
(KR), or performance. Vroom (1964) identified the 
difference between the informational and motivational 
aspect of KR. Informational KR gives information as to 
both the nature and locus of errors; hence the person can 
easily correct mistakes. The motivational aspect of KR 
concerns only providing feedback about accomplishment 
(e.g., percent correct), but not how to improve subsequent 
performance. Therefore, any improvement in performance 
resulting from motivational type KR would be mostly due to 
motivation.
8In terms of goal setting Locke is saying that when 
KR is given it is not sufficient that the person receive 
KR; it is what the person does with the KR that determines 
any subsequent improvement in performance. Locke and 
Bryan (1967) showed that no performance difference was 
found when groups of subjects receiving KR were contrasted 
with subjects not receiving KR. However, when subjects 
were reclassified into "goal" groups (e.g., a group trying 
to reach the standard set by the experimenter, or a group 
trying to "do their best") a significant improvement was 
found for subjects who were trying to reach the standard. 
The main idea is that it is not sufficient for the person 
to just receive feedback; the person has to use that 
feedback as a means of improving performance (i.e., 
setting and reaching intermediate goals).
Erez (1977) noted that in the goal-performance 
relationship being addressed by Locke, KR was not 
considered to be a sufficient condition for goal setting 
and task motivation to occur. KR was simply seen as a 
variable which could influence the goal-performance 
relationship as previously described. She proposed that 
KR could be considered a necessary condition for the 
relationship to be observed. That is, goals and KR must 
both be present, and interact with each other, to produce 
the goal-performance relationship. In her experiment 
(1977) she succeeded in demonstrating that subjects' 
performance with KR was significantly closer to their self
9set goals than was the performance of subjects who did not 
receive KR. Thus, she concluded that KR was a necessary 
condition for the goal-performance relationship to be * 
observed.
More recently Locke, Saari, Shaw, and Latham (1981), 
in their extensive review of the goal setting literature 
from 1969-1980, concluded that neither the existence of a 
goal by itself, nor KR by itself is sufficient to increase 
performance. Both are necessary conditions for observing 
the linear goal-performance relationship.
Parkinson's Law
"Work expands to fill the time available for it's 
completion." This quote from Parkinson (1957, p. 2), 
known as Parkinson's law, rings true for many tasks which 
we encounter in our daily lives. Parkinson's illustration 
of an elderly lady taking all day to write a postcard 
perhaps best expresses how people tend to "stretch out" a 
task so that its completion conforms to the end of the 
time allotted to do the task.
In an attempt to explain how the underlying 
mechanism of Parkinson's law operates, Aronson and Gerard 
(1966) gave subjects either extra time or a minimum amount 
of time to complete a task; and then observed the time 
required to complete a subsequent task. The results 
showed the predicted relationship; subjects initially
10
given extra time to complete a task subsequently took 
longer to complete a second task if given excess time.
The authors explained the results in terms of 
procrastinating, in terms of Guthrie's (1935) theory of 
learning (i.e., learning to spend a long time on a task 
after initially allowed extra time), and in terms of 
Festinger's (1957) theory of cognitive dissonance 
(spending excess time on the task increased it's 
importance and justified spending a large amount of time 
on it in the future)• However, Aronson and Gerard point 
out that their experiment did not identify the underlying 
mechanism of their observations.
Bryan and Locke (1967) offer an explanation of 
Parkinson's law which does identify the mechanism by which 
work expands to fill the time allotted. Their experiment, 
in which all subject's received KR, showed that subjects 
given an excess amount of time to complete a simple 
addition task (i.e., adding three two-digit numbers) took 
longer to complete the task than subjects given a minimum 
amount of time to complete the task. Their explication 
was that goal setting acted as the mediating factor 
between length of performance and the time allotted to 
complete the task.
I propose that when an excess amount of time is 
available to complete a task, a person is most likely to 
set intermediate goals which allow an even amount of task 
completion per time unit; resulting in a "lengthening" of
11
the task. Accordingly, a "shortening" of task length 
would occur when a minimum amount of time was available to 
complete the task. For example, a person asked to produce 
15 widgets in 1 hour will set the intermediate goal of 
producing approximately 1 widget every 4 minutes (1 widget 
per 4 minutes X 60 minutes = 15 widgets); provided the 
goal is accepted. His performance will then be that of 
taking one hour to produce 15 widgets. If a person is 
given the goal of producing 15 widgets in 45 minutes, he 
might set the goal of producing 1 widget every 3 minutes 
(1 widget per 3 minutes X 45 minutes = 15 widgets); again, 
providing the goal is accepted. His performance will thus 
be 15 widgets per 45 minutes compared to 15 widgets per 1 
hour.
We can now see how a person may set his intermediate 
goals based on both his final goal, and the amount of time 
allotted to reach that goal. Thus, the process by which a 
person sets his intermediate goals (i.e., intentions) is 
one explanation of the mediating mechanism through which 
work expands to fill the time allotted to complete the 
task •
The application of Parkinson’s law to a real world 
situation was demonstrated by Latham and Locke (1975) 
where the number of days wood-harvesting crews could sell 
wood was reduced; thus raising the production goal. The 
results show the harvesting crews increased output per 
man-hour when the time restrictions were imposed. The
12
results also support the view that intentions (goals set 
by the harvesting crews) were the mediating factor between 
the increased goals and increased performance.
Hypothesized Internal Processes in a No-KR Situation
Recall that when a high goal is accompanied by KR 
the outcome is increased performance over either a low 
goal with KR, or a high goal without KR. The mechanism by 
which high goals operate to improve performance was 
explained to be the level of intermediate goals 
(intentions) set in trying to reach the final goal. Thus, 
feedback given to subjects enables the setting of more 
accurate intermediate goals which help facilitate subjects 
reaching the final goal, and the work "contracts" or 
"expands" to fill the time allotted.
When no KR is given, the subject is unable to set 
intermediate goals by the same mechanism (i.e., via 
external KR) to reach the final goal. However, Ammons 
(1954) pointed out that when no external KR is available 
the subject will provide his own "internal" KR (e.g., "I 
must be about half-way through the task."). It is safe 
to assume that intermediate goals may be set by the 
subject, even in the absence of external KR, based 
internally rather than externally. These intermediate 
goals will probably not be as accurate as those set when 
external KR is available since the subject has no external 
basis for knowing how he is doing. Accordingly, Aronson 
and Gerard (1966) showed that after performing a task a
13
subject's future performance on the same task is likely to 
be quantitatively similar. Integrating the two studies, I 
feel that the intermediate goals a subject sets in the 
absence of KR are based primarily on prior experience; and 
his subsequent performance thus corresponds to this prior 
performance.
Hypothesized Internal Processes in a No-KR/Low Goal 
Situation
After prior experience, if a subject is given a low 
goal ("low" in comparison to the prior experience or 
performance) and KR, he will set and meet intermediate 
goals which are based on the KR received in attempting to 
reach that final, low goal. However, when a subject with 
prior experience is given a low goal but no KR, he will 
set intermediate goals based on the prior experience.
These intermediate goals, which are based on KR, are 
probably easier than the intermediate goals based on prior 
experience, which occur without KR. This is so because 
the determination of the value of the "low" goal is based 
on the prior experience (i.e., performance) and is, by 
definition, quantitatively less than the past 
performance. Hence, the rate of problem solving needed to 
reach the low goal will be less than the rate needed 
during the prior performance. Consequently, the 
difference between low goal/KR performance and low 
goal/no-KR performance will be due to a slowing down in 
performance (i.e., setting of easier intermediate goals)
14
by subjects receiving KR rather than an increase in 
performance by subjects not receiving KR.
In terms of Parkinson's law, the work of the low 
goal/KR subjects will expand to fill the time allotted 
(via easier intermediate goals), while the work of the low 
goal/no-KR subjects will stay about the same as in the 
previous performance (they will set basically the same 
intermediate goals).
Subjects assigned high goals will also set 
intermediate goals based on either available KR or prior 
experience. Accordingly, high goal/KR subjects' work will 
"contract," and high goal/no-KR subjects' work will 
"expand" to meet their respective goals.
Locke, Saari, Shaw, and Latham (1981) alluded to a 
corollary of the observation that work "expands" when 
given a high goal but no KR. They suggested that subjects 
tend to overestimate their performance toward a high goal 
when they don't know how close they are to that goal.
This overestimation leads to less performance and the work 
"expands." If the hypothesized internal processes 
suggested here are correct, the opposite effect should 
occur for low goal/no-KR subjects. That is, they should 
underestimate how much of their goal they have completed 
and their work should "contract."
Other Studies of KR and Goal Difficulty
Many studies in which KR (present or absent) and 
goal difficulty (low and high) were manipulated have been
15
conducted (e.g., Strang, Lawrence, & Fowler, 1978; Becker, 
1978). However, in none of these was there an opportunity 
for Parkinson's law to operate. That is, none of the 
studies allowed for a "lengthening" or "shortening" of the 
task based on intermediate goals. For example, in the 
Strang et al. (1978) study, subjects were given feedback, 
via tone intensity, after each response on a task (adding 
seven single-digit numbers). Since their goal of beating 
a previously set problem solving time could be reached on 
each trial, there was no need for subjects to set and meet 
accurate intermediate goals during the process of 
achieving the final goal. Accordingly, there was no 
observed difference between the low-goal group and the 
control group (no goal/no-KR) since there was no 
"lengthening" of the task for the low-goal group.
The present experiment differs from the Strang et 
al., experiment in that the KR will be provided in a 
manner which allows intermediate goal setting to occur and 
a decrement in performance to be observed when KR is 
present with a low goal.
Predictions
Based on the preceding discussion, the theoretical 
model forwarded by Erez and Zidon (1984) in their 
investigation of the effect of goal acceptance on the 
goal-performance relationship will be used in this 
experiment (See Figure 2). In terms of the present 
discussion "externally set goals" in Figure 2 are
16
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set 
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Cognition
Goal
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Intent ion 
(Self set 
. goals) y
Evaluation Performance
Feedback
Figure 2 . Conceptual model of the goal 
setting mechanism.
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subjects' final goals, and "intentions" are hypothesized to 
concern setting intermediate goals.
Does KR facilitate performance when the goal is low? It is 
hypothesized that there will be an interaction such that when the 
goal is difficult, subjects receiving KR will show higher 
performance than subjects not receiving KR; and, when the goal is 
low, subjects not receiving KR will show higher performance than 
subjects receiving KR (Hypothesis 1 - see Figure 1 again). This 
prediction holds that KR is not a necessary condition for 
observing increased performance when the final goal is low. A 
main effect of goal difficulty is also predicted, where high 
goals will result in greater performance than low goals 
(Hypothesis 2).
Since the basis for setting intermediate goals, without KR, 
is hypothesized to be prior experience, I predict that there will 
be a significant correlation between baseline session performance 
(the "prior experience" in this experiment) and criterion session 
performance, when no KR is provided. I also predict a 
correlation when KR is provided, but to a lesser degree 
(Hypothesis 3).
As a corollary to the hypothesized internal processes when 
no KR is available, I predict low goal/no-KR subjects will 
underestimate their performance, and high goal/no-KR subjects 
will overestimate their performance (Hypothesis 4).
18
Finallyf the rate of problem solving will be 
assessed on an exploratory basis by measuring the number 
of problems solved per 3 minutes during the criterion 
session. This investigation will provide a closer look at 
the nature of any performance decrement or increment in 
the experimental conditions.
19
Chapter II 
Method
Subjects
Fifty-two male and female studentsr enrolled in 
undergraduate classes at the University of Nebraska at 
Omaha, were randomly assigned to one of four experimental 
conditions. All subjects voluntarily participated and 
received extra credit for their class. It should be noted 
that 61 subjects took part in the experiment, but nine had 
to be replaced due to procedural errors by the subject 
(i.e., hitting a wrong key on the keyboard or responding 
in an improper sequence, which caused the computer program 
to stop).
Task
The task was to mentally sum seven single-digit 
numbers (all integers greater than zero) as they appeared 
on a Commodore PET computer screen, and to enter the 
answers into the computer. Performance was measured by 
the total number of answers given and by the rate of 
solving problems.
Materials
The seven single-digit numbers to be added were 
randomly generated and appeared on a computer screen 
(e.g., "1+2+3+4+5+6+7 =?"), 1 problem per display.
Problem numbers, when present, appeared above each 
problem. The experimental time was continuously present 
in the upper left-hand corner of the display and ran from
20
"000000" up to "000500" (baseline session) or "001500" 
(criterion session).
Procedure
Subjects sat at the computer terminal and were 
instructed that their task was to mentally sum each row of 
seven single-digit numbers as they appeared on the screen, 
1 problem per display. They were instructed to enter 
their answer for each problem by (1) hitting the "space 
bar," (2) pressing the appropriate numbers on the computer 
keyboard, and (3) hitting the "return" key; which also 
advanced the screen to the next display. This sequence of 
responding was also printed on the computer keyboard for 
later reference.
Subjects were told that their answer would be input 
at the point of the cursor, which always appeared to the 
right of the "?" symbol after each problem, and how to use 
the "delete" key to correct mistakes. They were then told 
that the elapsed time of the session would be continuously 
present in the upper left-hand corner of the display, and 
that there would be a baseline session lasting 5 minutes 
and a criterion session lasting 15 minutes. The 
information which was to appear on the display was 
reinforced by using a piece of paper with a sample display 
printed on it as a visual aid (See Appendix A for the 
sample display).
During the baseline session the subject was given 
the goal of completing as many problems as he or she could
21
(as accurately as possible) in 5 minutes. No feedback 
concerning problem numbers was given during the baseline 
session. The experimenter started the task for the 
baseline session and left the room.
The computer stopped the baseline session after 5 
minutes and provided accurate feedback concerning number 
of problems correct, number of problems wrong, and total 
problems completed during the baseline session. The 
subject was then instructed to call the experimenter into 
the room.
Meanwhile, the computer determined each subject's 
goal for the criterion session by using the total number 
of problems answered during the baseline session (x) as 
that subject's baseline rate. The computer calculated 
either a low goal, [(x)(3)(.75)] problems in 15 minutes, 
or a high goal, [ (x) (3) (1.25)] problems in 15 minutes, for 
each subject.
The experimenter returned and forwarded the screen 
to present and review the following information: (1)
average number of problems solved per minute during the 
last 5 minutes [total number of problems/5], (2) goal for 
the next 15 minutes, and (3) number of problems the 
subject would solve if he continued to work at the same 
rate during the criterion session.
The experimenter again reviewed how the computer 
display would appear during the criterion session by using 
a sample display (see Appendix B); when necessary, showing
22
where problem numbers would appear (see Appendix C). 
Subjects were also shown that their goal for the criterion 
session would always appear in the upper right-hand corner 
of the display.
The experimenter then told the subject to press the 
space bar to continue/ and left the room. The following 
questions were then asked by the computer.
A) I intend to reach the goal of completing __ problems
in the next 15 minutes.
1 = Strongly disagree
2 = Disagree
3 = Neither agree nor disagree
4 = Agree
5 = Strongly agree
B) I will try to reach my goal of completing __
problems in the next 15 minutes.
1 ■ Strongly disagree
2 = Disagree
3 = Neither agree nor disagree
4 * Agree
5 = Strongly agree
23
C) How difficult do you perceive your goal for the next 
15 minutes to be?
1 = Very easy
2 = Easy
3 = Neither easy nor difficult
4 * Difficult
5 = Very difficult
The criterion session then began, during which the 
problem numbers either appeared above every problem (KR 
condition), or did not appear (no-KR condition).
The computer stopped the task after 15 minutes and 
asked the following questions:
D) How many problems do you think you completed in the 
15 minute period?
E) It was easy to judge how much of the 15 minute time
limit I had left to reach my goal.
1 = Strongly disagree
2 = Disagree
3 = Neither agree nor disagree
4 = Agree
5 = Strongly agree
F) During the 15 minute session I was:
1 = Trying to reach the assigned goal
2 = Trying to get as close as possible to the
assigned goal
3 = Not trying to reach the assigned goal or to
get as close to it as possible
24
The subject then called the experimenter into the 
room and the post-criterion session questionnaire was 
administered (see Appendix D).
25
Chapter III 
Results
Goal Acceptance
After being assigned a goal, subjects were asked to 
indicate their acceptance of that goal. Since goal 
acceptance is a necessary condition in Locke's 
goal-performance relationship, it was decided to drop from 
further analyses those subjects who did not accept their 
goal (as measured on two 5-point pre-criterion session 
questions— see questions A and B). Thus, those subjects 
who either "disagreed" or "strongly disagreed" with both 
of the statements about "intending" or "trying" to reach 
their assigned goal were dropped from further analyses.
Of the five subjects subsequently dropped, three had been 
assigned a low goal, two had been assigned a high goal, 
and all five later received feedback via problem numbers 
(the feedback manipulation occurred after administration 
of the goal acceptance questions)•
As a response to a post-criterion session question, 
33 of 47 (70.2%) subjects indicated that they were "trying 
to reach the assigned goal" for the criterion session, 13 
(27.7%) were "trying to get as close as possible to the 
assigned goal," and one (2.1%) was "not trying to reach 
the assigned goal or to get as close to it as possible." 
The one subject who reported not trying to reach the 
assigned goal was not dropped from the data analyses 
because he or she had "strongly agreed" with both
26
pre-criterion goal acceptance questions about "intending" 
and "trying" to reach the assigned goal. It is very 
possible that the subject was referring to having a 
self-set goal when responding that he or she was not 
trying to reach the assigned goal. This subject later 
reported having a higher, non-specified goal in mind 
during the criterion session. As a result, this subject 
was not dropped from the data analyses. Thus, those 
subjects left in the analyses satisfied the first 
condition of the goal-setting paradigm; they accepted the 
goal.
Manipulation Checks
After indicating their goal acceptance, subjects 
were given a question about how difficult they perceived 
the goal to be (measured on a 5 point scale— see question
C). Ratings of subjects assigned a high goal (M=3.54, 
SD=0.58) were significantly higher (indicating greater 
difficulty) than ratings of subjects assigned a low goal 
(M=2.61, SD=0.59)? F(l, 43)=15.71, £<.001. Ratings of 
subjects who received KR (M=2.81, SD=0.98) were 
significantly lower than ratings of subjects who did not 
receive KR (M=3.31, SD=0.93); F(l, 43)=4.72, £<.04. Since 
subjects knew whether they were going to receive KR before 
answering this question, the significant difference 
between KR groups has implications for the role KR played 
in the perceived difficulty of the goal. That is, KR 
subjects may have felt that the goal would be easier
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because they would have feedback about their progress 
toward that goal. On the other hand, no-KR subjects knew 
that they would not have performance feedback, and felt 
the goal was more difficult. So, telling subjects that KR 
was going to be provided may have reduced the perceived 
difficulty of the goal. However, there was no goal 
difficulty-KR interaction on this question, so the effect 
of reducing the perceived difficulty of the goal did not 
differ between goal difficulty groups. Overall, these 
results shows that the goal difficulty manipulation [low 
goal (LG) versus high goal (HG)] was successful.
Further, all subjects assigned a low goal (n=23) 
surpassed that goal in the criterion session, while only 6 
of 24 (25.0%) assigned a high goal performed better than 
that goal. Thus, the percent exceeding the goal for each 
goal difficulty group was acceptable, and corresponded to 
a general definition of a "low" or "high" goal. Together, 
this manipulation and the goal difficulty ratings provided 
the second necessary component in the goal setting 
paradigm, a specific high, or low, goal.
There was no direct measure of the feedback 
manipulation. However, 19 of 21 (90.0%) subjects who 
received problem numbers reported looking at them at least 
once during the criterion session; subjects noticed the 
available feedback. This measure provides support for the 
third necessary condition in the goal-setting paradigm 
being present, feedback.
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Therefore, in general, the goal difficulty and 
feedback manipulations were successful. Subjects 
perceived the high goal as harder than the low goal and, 
when available, referred to the problem numbers as a 
source of feedback.
Performance
For analyses purposes it was decided to 
statistically control for problem solving ability as a 
possible source of bias in the data. Since baseline 
session performance can be taken as a measure of problem 
solving ability, the total number of problems completed 
during the baseline session was treated as a covariate in 
the analyses. It should be noted that since the value of 
the goal was determined by a numerical transformation of 
each subjects' baseline session performance, the goal was 
already adjusted for ability. However, the use of 
baseline session performance as a covariate (although 
somewhat redundant) provided a more exact control of 
ability as a source of variance.
In order to utilize baseline session performance as 
a covariate some assumptions needed to be tested.
Elashoff (1969) identified the critical assumptions for 
the use of analysis of covariance (ANCOVA). Assumption 
1: The covariate is independent of treatment. "To
achieve this statistical independence, the X variable 
should be measured prior to the administration of 
treatments and treatments should be assigned to groups at
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random" (p. 388)• This assumption was met because the 
covariate (baseline session performance) was measured 
before any experimental manipulation occurred, and 
subjects were randomly assigned to treatments.
Assumption 2s Treatment-slope interaction.
Elashoff (1969) stated that "the standard covariance 
analyses procedure rests on the assumption that the 
regression of Y on X is linear, and that the slope is the 
same for all treatment groups (there is no treatment-slope 
interaction)" (p. 391). An F-test revealed that the 
slopes did not differ significantly among the four groups, 
F (3,39)=.44, n.s. Thus, this assumption was met.
Assumption 3: Linearity of regression, "...the
standard covariance analysis assumes that the covariate 
has a linear relationship with the criterion variable..." 
(p. 390). For this assumption to be valid in this study, 
there must be a linear relationship between baseline 
session performance and criterion session performance. 
Elashoff states that "the simplest check for linearity is 
a carefully prepared set of X-Y scatterplots for each 
treatment group. Gross departures from linearity will be 
easily discovered" (p. 391). Visual inspection of the 
scatterplots for the four treatment groups yielded no 
gross departures from linearity, so this assumption is 
valid. Thus, the critical assumptions of ANCOVA are 
present, and its use as a statistical technique is 
justified.
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A 2x2 ANCOVA was performed on the data (see Table 1 
for means and adjusted means) and revealed a marginal main 
effect of goal difficulty (see Table 2)* As predicted 
(Hypothesis 2) subjects assigned a high goal completed 
more problems (adj. M=82.89, SD=20.86) than did subjects 
assigned a low goal (adj. M=78.20, SD=15.68). However, 
there was no main effect of KR and, contrary to Hypothesis 
1, there was no goal difficulty-KR interaction. Thus, the 
number of problems completed depended on the difficulty of 
the goal, not on the presence of KR or the interaction of 
KR and goal difficulty.
Since five subjects were dropped from the analyses 
due to lack of goal acceptance, the design is 
non-orthogonal. To analyze non-orthogonal designs 
Applebaum and Cramer (1974) offer the technique of testing 
each main effect while "ignoring" the other (i.e., testing 
y=M + baseline session performance + goal difficulty vs. 
y=M + baseline session performance; and y=M + baseline 
session performance + KR vs. y=M + baseline session 
performance) in addition to the usual test "eliminating" 
the other main effect. These ANCOVA's yielded no change 
in significance from the previously stated results for the 
main effect of goal difficulty [F (1,44)=3.74, p<.060] or 
for the main effect of KR [F (1,44)=0.54, n.s.].
In order to further inspect the criterion session 
performance, the session was divided into five 3-minute 
intervals and the number of problems completed in each
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Table 1
Observed and Adjusted Means for 
Criterion Session Performance
Knowledge
of
Results
Goal
Low
Difficulty
High
Present
obs . M 75.80 86.27
ad j. M 78.71 84.06
SD 14.71 22.61
Cell n 10 11
Absent
obs. M 75.15 84.62
ad j • M 77.69 81.71
SD 16.96 20.16
Cell n 13 13
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Table 2 
ANCOVA Summary Table
Source df MS £ Sia. of P
Covariate
Baseline 1 13404.30 195.29 .001
Main effects 2 140.79 2.05 .141
Goal diff. 1 243.20 3.54 .067
KR 1 33.49 0.49 .489
Interaction
Goal diff.
X KR 1 5.15 .07 .786
Explained 4 3422.75 49.87 .001
Residual 42 68.64
Total 46 360.30
Note: Dependent 
Covariate
Variable = Criterion Session Performance 
= Baseline Session Performance
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interval was recorded. The means and standard deviations
of these intervals (across all conditions) are shown in
Table 3. Results from a repeated measures analysis
revealed a significant difference among the 5 intervals,
F (4,184)=3.49, p<.01. However, the small magnitude of the 
2
difference (w =.005), suggests that it was due to a 
slight "warm-up" effect in the first 3-minute interval. 
That is, subjects may have been getting reacquainted with 
the sequence of answering problems during the first 3 
minutes of the criterion session, causing a small 
difference in mean number of problems solved. Subjects 
then performed at a steady rate during the last 4 
intervals of the session. Further inspection revealed no 
significant differences between the interval means for any 
of the four conditions.
Finally, contrary to Hypothesis 3, the correlation 
of baseline session performance to criterion session 
performance was not significantly different for the two KR 
groups: KR group (£=. 8888, n=26), no-KR group (r.= .9105, 
n=21); using r to Z transformations (Cohen and Cohen,
1975), Z=0.36, n.s.
Subjects1 Perceptions and Self-Set Goals
Twenty-nine of 47 (61.7%) subjects indicated that 
they either "strongly disagreed" or "disagreed" that "it 
was easy to tell the amount of time left in the criterion 
session." Subjects may have felt that calculating the 
time remaining required too much effort since they would
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Table 3
Performance Means for the Five 3-Minute 
Intervals of the Criterion Session
Interval M SD
I 1 I 15.36 I 4.25 I
I 2 | 16.19 I 3.94 |
I 3 | 16.26 | 4.03 I
I 4 I 16.40 | 4.07 I
I 5 | 16.09 | 3.94 I
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have to subtract the display time from 15 minutes to 
arrive at the time remaining.
It was predicted (Hypothesis 4) that LG/no-KR 
subjects would underestimate their actual performance and 
HG-no-KR subjects would overestimate their performance.
As can be seen in Table 4, LG/no-KR subjects actually did 
underestimate their performance? however, HG-no-KR 
subjects also underestimated their performance. Overall, 
performance estimates by subjects who received problem 
numbers corresponded significantly closer to actual 
performance (were more accurate) than did the estimates of 
subjects who did not receive problem numbers: KR -
(r.= .9848, n=21), no-KR - (r.= .6692, n=26) ? using r to Z 
transformations - £=5.17, p<.001.
In response to a question concerning the certainty 
of reaching their goal, subjects assigned a low goal were 
significantly more certain (on a 7-point scale— see 
question 5 in Appendix D) that they had reached their goal 
than subjects assigned a high goal? low goal (M=2.22,
SD=1.35), high goal (M=4.83, SD=1.95)? F(l, 43)=3.54, 
£<.001. This result is not very surprising since 100% of 
subjects assigned a low goal passed that goal. Also, 
subjects receiving KR were significantly more certain that 
they had reached their goal than subjects not receiving 
KR? KR (M=2.76, SD=2.34), no-KR (M=4.19, SD=1.72), F(l, 
43)=11.10, £<.002. Again, this result is to be expected 
since KR subjects knew how close they were to their goal.
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Table 4
Estimated Criterion Session Performance/ Actual 
Performance/ and the Significance of Their Difference
Experimental
Group
Criterion
Estimated
Session
Actual
Performance
t-testa
LG-noKR (n=13)
M 50.85 75.15
SD 15.07 16.96 p<.002
HG-noKR (n=13)
M 66.29 84.62
SD 33.70 20.16 p<.018
atwo-tailed
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However, there was no interaction between goal difficulty 
and the presence of KR [F(l, 43)=.44, n.s.] on this 
scale. Thus, subjects' certainty of reaching their goal 
depended on the difficulty of the goal and on whether they 
received KR, but not on the interaction of goal difficulty 
and KR.
Seventeen of 23 (73.9%) subjects assigned a low
goal, and 10 of 24 (41.7%) subjects assigned a high goal,
reported having a goal other than the assigned goal in
mind during the criterion session. The "other goals" most
often reported were "a non-specified goal higher than the
assigned goal" (n=12) and "increased accuracy" (n=5);
various other goals were reported by the remaining
subjects (n=7). A Chi square test revealed no significant
difference between low goal and high goal groups in terms
2
of percent who had another goal in mind; X (1,
N=47)=.129, n.s. Thus, many subjects (27/47, 57.0%) felt 
that they should try to reach a goal other than their 
assigned goal during the criterion session. On the other 
hand, only three of 47 (6.4%) subjects reported setting 
and using intermediate goals (i.e., trying to complete a 
self-set number of problems per minute) during the 
criterion session. Thus, the cognitive strategy of 
utilizing intermediate goals to reach the final goal was 
not common in this experiment.
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Computer Display
The number of times each subject reported looking 
at the clock during the criterion session is shown in 
Table 5. As can be seen, 66,0% (31 of 47) of the subjects 
looked at the clock in the computer display less than once 
every three minutes, including 14.9% (7 of 47) who never 
looked. A total of 38.3% (18 of 47) reported adjusting 
their rate of problem solving based on looking at the 
clock. So, a majority of subjects (40/47, 85.1%) looked 
at the clock, but less than half of these (18/40, 45.0%) 
adjusted their problem solving rate based on that 
information. This result indicates that the clock might 
not have been used as often as expected as a source of 
feedback about time left to reach the goal.
The number of times each subject reported looking 
at the problem numbers during the criterion session is 
shown in Table 6. Again, 66.7% (14 of 21) of subjects who 
had problem numbers looked at them less than once every 
three minutes. Forty-three percent (9 of 21) reported 
adjusting their rate of problem solving based on looking 
at the problem numbers. Again, a majority of subjects 
(19/21, 90.5%) looked at the problem numbers, but less 
than half of these subjects (9/19, 47.4%) adjusted their 
problem solving rate based on that information. Thus, in 
general, subjects looked at the problem numbers but did 
not use that feedback to adjust their work rate.
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Table 5
Number of Times Each Subject Reported Looking 
at the Clock During the Criterion Session
Number of times Cumulative
>oked at clock Frequency Percent percent
0 7 14.9 14.9
1 2 4.3 19.2
2 8 17.0 36.2
3 8 17.0 53.2
4 6 12.8 66.0
5 9 19.1 85.1
7 1 2.1 87.2
10 3 6.4 93.6
15 2 4.3 97.9
35 1 2.1 100.0
Total 47 100.0
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Table 6
Number of Times Each Subject Reported Looking at 
the Problem Numbers During the Criterion Session
Number of times Cumulative
looked at numbers Freauencv Percent percent
0 2 9.5 9.5
1 3 14.3 23.8
2 4 18.9 42.7
3 2 9.5 52.2
4 3 14.3 66.5
5 2 9.5 76.0
6 1 4.8 81.8
7 1 4.8 85.6
10 1 4.8 90.4
20 1 4.8 95.2
every problem 1 4.8 100.0
Total 21
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Chapter IV 
Discussion
Does feedback facilitate performance when the goal 
is low? It was predicted that subjects given a low goal 
and feedback would not perform as well as subjects given 
only a low goal. This experiment was conducted to address 
that hypothesis in a laboratory setting.
In order to test the hypothesis under the goal 
setting rubric, three conditions had to be met. Subjects 
had to be provided with a specific goal, they had to 
accept that goal, and they had to be given feedback about 
their performance in relation to the goal. Thus, subjects 
were given a specific (numerical) goal, all subjects 
included in the analyses indicated acceptance of their 
goal, and those who were supposed to (feedback was an 
experimental manipulation) received feedback.
The results of the analysis on criterion session 
performance did not support the predicted results; there 
was no goal difficulty - KR interaction in terms of 
performance. There was, however, a marginal main effect 
of goal difficulty; subjects assigned a high goal 
performed significantly better than subjects assigned a 
low goal. In essence, the results provide support for 
Locke's basic tenets the higher the goal the higher the 
performance.
A possible explanation for why no goal difficulty - 
KR interaction, and only a marginal main effect of goal
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difficulty, were found is that subjects did not use the KR 
in the predicted manner. It was hypothesized that low 
goal/no-KR subjects would set intermediate goals based on 
their baseline session performance, but that low goal/KR 
subjects would set intermediate goals based on the 
feedback provided. However, only a few (three of 47) 
subjects reported using self-set goals as a strategy to 
reach their final goal. This observation suggests that 
subjects did not try to complete a self-set number of 
problems per unit time. Rather, it seems that they simply 
tried to complete as many problems as they could in the 
allotted time, regardless of the difficulty of the goal or 
whether they received feedback; subjects "sprinted" in 
their performance. This sprinting thus precluded any 
chance of observing the mechanism by which feedback was 
predicted to result in low performance for low goal 
subjects (i.e., a decrease in problem solving rate due to 
setting of easier intermediate goals). So the process 
underlying the main hypotheses of this experiment, setting 
intermediate goals, did not occur.
There are three findings which support the idea 
that subjects did not utilize the available information in 
the predicted manner and sprinted in their performance. 
First, although 40 of 47 subjects reported looking at the 
clock at least once, 31 said they looked less than once 
every three minutes and only 18 adjusted their rate of 
problem solving based on looking. Thus, in general
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subjects did not consistently use the clock as a source of 
information about how much time was left to reach their 
goal, or as a source to adjust their rate of problem 
solving.
Second, although 19 of 21 subjects reported they 
looked at the problem numbers at least once, seven looked 
less than once every five minutes, and, overall, only nine 
adjusted their rate of problem solving based on looking. 
So, it seems that subjects were not concerned with using 
problem numbers as a source of information to reach their 
goal.
Third, 27 of 47 subjects (17 of 23 of whom were 
assigned a low goal) reported having another goal in mind 
during the criterion session and, overall, 17 of those 
subjects' goals were higher than the assigned goal ("a 
non-specified goal higher than the assigned goal" was most 
common, n=12). So more than half of the subjects were 
trying to perform better than their assigned goal.
These three results support the explanation that 
many subjects were simply trying to perform at their 
highest rate regardless of the presence of feedback or the 
difficulty of the goal. The fact that a marginal main 
effect of goal difficulty was found under these conditions 
attests to the robustness of goal setting theory.
A possible reason why the sprinting effect was 
encountered is the evaluation apprehension inherent in the 
experiment. In an experiment on the effect of evaluation
44
apprehension, White, Mitchell, and Bell (1977) succeeded 
in separating the effects of having a goal from the 
effects of evaluation apprehension and social cues. An 
increase in performance was observed when subjects knew 
their work was going to be evaluated. They noted that in 
experimental studies "subjects generally know or expect 
that their performance will be evaluated by the 
experimenter" (p. 666). Thus, the evaluation apprehension 
present in this experiment is a possible explanation for 
why subjects seemed to perform their best regardless of 
the experimental manipulations.
Another possible explanation for why subjects 
"sprinted" is that they had a high level of intrinsic
motivation to perform well on the task; were high in terms
of need achievement (Miner, 1980). This idea is supported 
by the fact that subjects were college students, a group 
which has been shown to posses a high level of need 
achievement (Atkinson and Raynor, 1974). Since high need 
achievement people tend to set challenging goals and try 
to reach those goals (Hampton, 1976), subjects may have 
used the experimental situation as a chance to perform 
their best (i.e., sprint).
In terms of the theoretical model of the goal 
setting mechanism forwarded by Erez and Zidon (1984)— see 
Figure 2— there is evidence for all of the components 
being present in this experiment. However, there was not
much evidence for the hypothesized occurrence of
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intentions (self-set goals) taking the form of 
intermediate goals. A possible reason for intermediate 
goals not being set is that if subjects wanted to perform 
their best under the evaluative circumstances, setting 
intermediate goals (pacing themselves) would not have been 
advantageous.
Another explanation of why setting intermediate 
goals was not a common strategy is the length of the 
criterion session. Subjects may have felt that the 
session was not long enough to necessitate using 
intermediate goals as a strategy to avoid fatigue. So 
regardless of whether evaluation apprehension is present 
in a situation, a subject may still pace himself if 
fatigue is a possibility; it was not likely in this 
experiment's 15 minute work period.
The predicted results may have been observed if 
either of two additional experimental conditions were 
met. First, the apprehension associated with being 
evaluated should have been avoided. For an experiment 
conducted under laboratory conditions, avoiding evaluation 
apprehension may be very difficult. A way to avoid 
evaluation apprehension would have been to conduct the 
experiment in a real world setting where performance on 
the criterion task is not the only task upon which 
performance is measured. Thus, evaluation apprehension 
could be less focused on the criterion task. The point of 
suggesting this additional condition is that reducing
46
evaluation apprehension might reduce the likelihood of 
subjects sprinting in their performance, and increase the 
chances of their pacing themselves by setting intermediate 
goals.
If avoiding evaluation apprehension is not 
possible, then a second experimental condition, length of 
task, might have increased the likelihood of observing the 
predicted results. The length of the task in this 
experiment (15 minutes) did not necessitate setting 
intermediate goals to avoid fatigue since subjects were 
able to sprint throughout the criterion session.
Increasing the length might have made it more likely that 
subjects would utilize lower intermediate goals to "pace" 
themselves. This suggested condition is basic to the 
predictions in this experiment since a decrement in 
performance (setting of lower intermediate goals) was 
predicted.
In conclusion, the evidence from this experiment 
suggests that setting intermediate goals is a strategy 
which use depends on the situation. As noted, two 
circumstances which may facilitate setting intermediate 
goals are when evaluation apprehension is low or task 
length is long.
Further research might investigate the task length 
at which task completion warrants (i.e., makes it 
cognitively advantageous) setting intermediate goals. 
Further research could also investigate whether there is a
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difference across types of tasks (e.g., addition versus 
proofreading) in terms of the point at which setting 
intermediate goals becomes advantageous. If this further 
research did yield a task duration at which setting 
intermediate goals becomes advantageous, Parkinson's law 
might be revised to read, "Work expands to fill the time 
available for it's completion...when advantageous to do 
so."
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Appendix A
l + 2 + 3 + 4 + 5 + 6 + 7 =
HIT THE SPACE BAR WHEN READY TO ANSWER
l + 2 + 3 + 4 + 5 + 6 + 7 = ?
ENTER YOUR ANSWER AND HIT THE "RETURN" KEY
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Appendix B
001500 GOAL =
IN 1500 MINUTES
l + 2 + 3 + 4 + 5 + 6 + 7 =
HIT THE SPACE BAR WHEN READY TO ANSWER
001500 GOAL =
IN 1500 MINUTES
l + 2 + 3 + 4 + 5 + 6 + 7 = ?
ENTER YOUR ANSWER AND HIT THE "RETURN" KEY
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001500
001500
Appendix C
GOAL =
IN 1500 MINUTES
PROBLEM #19 
l + 2 + 3 + 4 + 5 + 6 + 7 =
HIT THE SPACE BAR WHEN READY TO ANSWER
GOAL =
IN 1500 MINUTES
PROBLEM #19 
l + 2 + 3 + 4 + 5 + 6 + 7 = ?
ENTER YOUR ANSWER AND HIT THE "RETURN" KEY
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Appendix D
INTERVIEW:
1) RELAX AND THINK ABOUT THE LAST 15 MINUTES. I AM 
GOING TO ASK YOU SOME OPEN ENDED QUESTIONS, AND SOME 
WHICH YOU SHOULD ANSWER YES OR NO.
2) ANSWER YES OR NO;
BESIDES THE GOAL THAT WAS ASSIGNED TO YOU FOR THE 15 
MINUTE SESSION, DID YOU HAVE ANY OTHER GOAL IN MIND 
DURING THE SESSION.
 NO
_____ YES - ELABORATE
3) ANSWER WITH A NUMBER:
A) APPROXIMATELY HOW MANY TIMES DID YOU LOOK AT THE 
CLOCK DURING THE 15 MINUTES SESSION? _____
OPEN ENDED QUESTION:
CAN YOU RECALL WHEN YOU LOOKED AT THE CLOCK?
OR, CAN YOU PERHAPS RECALL HOW MUCH TIME WAS LEFT 
WHEN YOU LOOKED?
ANSWER YES OR NO
B) DID YOU ADJUST YOUR RATE OF PROBLEM SOLVING BASED 
ON LOOKING AT THE CLOCK?
_____ NO
_____ YES - ELABORATE
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**IF KR**
4) ANSWER WITH A NUMBER:
A) APPROXIMATELY HOW MANY TIMES DID YOU LOOK AT 
PROBLEM NUMBERS DURING THE 15 MINUTES 
SESSION?_____
OPEN ENDED QUESTION;
CAN YOU RECALL WHEN YOU LOOKED AT THE PROBLEM 
NUMBERS? OR, CAN YOU PERHAPS RECALL HOW MUCH TIME 
WAS LEFT WHEN YOU LOOKED?
ANSWER YES OR NO
B) DID YOU ADJUST YOUR RATE OF PROBLEM SOLVING BASED 
ON LOOKING AT THE PROBLEM NUMBERS?
  NO
_____  YES - ELABORATE
5) PLEASE READ THE FOLLOWING QUESTION AND TELL ME THE 
NUMBER WHICH CORRESPONDS TO YOUR ANSWER.
RATE HOW CERTAIN YOU ARE THAT YOU REACHED YOUR GOAL 
FOR THE LAST 15 MINUTES.
1 = VERY CERTAIN THAT I REACHED THE GOAL
2 = CERTAIN THAT I REACHED THE GOAL
3 = SOMEWHAT CERTAIN THAT I REACHED THE GOAL
4 = DO NOT KNOW IF I REACHED THE GOAL
5 = SOMEWHAT CERTAIN THAT I DID NOT REACH THE GOAL
6 = CERTAIN THAT I DID NOT REACH THE GOAL
7 = VERY CERTAIN THAT I DID NOT REACH THE GOAL 
RATING - _____
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ANSWER YES OR NO
6) DID YOU HAVE ANY INTERMEDIATE, OR SUB-GOALS IN MIND 
DURING THE 15 MINUTE SESSION?
  NO - OR DO NOT UNDERSTAND: THEN PROVIDE AN
EXAMPLE ("COMPLETING 4 PROBLEMS PER MINUTE TO 
REACH MY GOAL.")
_____  YES - ELABORATE
